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Zimbabwea b s t r a c t
Smallholder irrigation schemes are largely supply driven such that they exclude the beneﬁciaries on the
management decisions and the choice of the irrigation schemes that would best suit their local needs. It is
against this background that the decentralisation framework and the Dublin Principles on Integrated
Water Resource Management (IWRM) emphasise the need for a participatory approach to water manage-
ment. The Zimbabwean government has gone a step further in decentralising the management of irriga-
tion schemes, that is promoting farmer managed irrigation schemes so as to ensure effective
management of scarce community based land and water resources. The study set to investigate the
way in which the Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme is managed with speciﬁc emphasis on the role of
the Irrigation Management Committee (IMC), the level of accountability and the powers devolved to
the IMC. Merrey’s 2008 critique of IWRM also informs this study which views irrigation as going beyond
infrastructure by looking at how institutions and decision making processes play out at various levels
including at the irrigation scheme level. The study was positioned on the hypothesis that ‘decentralised
or autonomous irrigation management enhances the sustainability and effectiveness of irrigation
schemes’. To validate or falsify the stated hypothesis, data was gathered using desk research in the form
of reviewing articles, documents from within the scheme and ﬁeld research in the form of questionnaire
surveys, key informant interviews and ﬁeld observation. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences was
used to analyse data quantitatively, whilst content analysis was utilised to analyse qualitative data
whereby data was analysed thematically. Comparative analysis was carried out as Guyu-Chelesa irriga-
tion scheme was compared with other smallholder irrigation scheme’s experiences within Zimbabwe and
the Sub Saharan African region at large. The ﬁndings were that whilst the scheme is a model of a decen-
tralised entity whose importance lies at improving food security and employment creation within the
community, it falls short in representing a downwardly accountable decentralised irrigation scheme.
The scheme is faced with various challenges which include its operation which is below capacity utilisa-
tion, absence of specialised technical human personnel to address infrastructural breakdowns, uneven
distribution of water pressure, incapacitated Irrigation Management Committee (IMC), absence of a
locally legitimate constitution, compromised beneﬁciary participation and unclear lines of communica-
tion between various institutions involved in water management. Understanding decentralization is
important since one of the key tenets of IWRM is stakeholder participation which the decentralization
framework interrogates.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) has been cen-
tral in the post-Dublin management of water resources in sub-Sah-
aran Africa (Global Water Partnership, 2000, 2003; van der Zaag,
2005; Jonker, 2007; Merrey, 2008; Molle, 2008; Swatuk, 2005).Some of the key tenets for IWRM according to Gleick (2002) in
Mapedza and Geheb (2010) are:
(1) Fresh water is a ﬁnite and vulnerable resource, essential to
sustain life, development and the environment.
(2) Water development and management should be based on a
participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-
makers at all levels.
(3) Women play a central role in the provision, management
and safeguarding of water.
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should be recognised as an economic good.
This study looks at tenet number 2 of IWRM and interrogates
how small holder irrigators in Guyu-Chelesa are managing water
resources using the decentralization lens. A number of studies have
critiqued IWRM with the hope of improving its application in the
developing world (Merrey, 2008; Molle, 2008; Swatuk, 2002,
2005). The remainder of this paper will delve into decentralization
as a mechanism for understanding the smallholder’s participation
in IWRM using decentralized irrigation management as an entry
point.
1.1. Decentralization
Conyers (1999, p. 6) deﬁnes decentralization as ‘‘a process of
change in which functions previously undertaken by govern-
ment institutions at national level become the responsibility of
government or non-government institutions at sub-national le-
vel’’. Asserted in the deﬁnition is that decentralization involves
the centre devolving its powers to the periphery in order to en-
gage the governed in the governance process. This conception
resonates with those of Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) who ar-
gue that decentralization allows for the disaggregation and tai-
loring of development plans and programs to the needs of the
heterogeneous regions and groups (Mulwafu (2010) on Malawi).
Mamdani (1996) also adds that decentralization offers people a
‘citizenship status’ rather than a ‘subject status’ since citizens
have rights to exercise while subjects have no rights. Other pro-
ponents of decentralization such as Ribot et al. (2006), Agrawal
and Ribot (1999) justify it on the grounds of increased efﬁ-
ciency, more thorough going equity and greater participation
and responsiveness of government to citizens. These sentiments
are also shared by Wekwete and de Valk (1990) who notes that
decentralization increases speed, ﬂexibility and more efﬁcient
use of existing resources. Ribot et al. (2006) further note that
it is only downwardly accountable decentralization, that is more
likely to result in positive outcomes. They further argue that
decentralization which is upwardly accountable to central gov-
ernment is best described as de-concentration of the central
state.
However, while decentralization is applauded for increasing
citizen participation, in most Latin American states and Asian
countries only a few elite individuals are the ones who partic-
ipate in the process rather than the majority poor. In Zimba-
bwe as noted by Makumbe (1998) Village Development
Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees
(WADCOs) were meant to facilitate grass roots participation
at a local level in ‘decision making processes for development
planning and implementation’ in their localities. However,
these committees as postulated by Makumbe, failed to execute
their mandate due to various reasons which among others in-
clude lack of authority to raise resources, lack of capacity and
the requisite skills (Makumbe, 1998). Merrey (2008)’s critique
of IWRM has relevance here in that power dynamics have to
be understood within decentralization. The fact that ‘decentral-
ization’ is being implemented will not necessarily produce po-
sitive outcomes.
Decentralization policy has been used in local and natural re-
sources management since the 1960s. In Zimbabwe, decentraliza-
tion efforts can be traced to the Prime Minister’s Directive of
1984 which sought to establish local authorities hence the promul-
gation of the Urban and Rural District Councils Act of 1985. The
Water Act of 1998 was also enacted with the view of promoting
decentralized water management in Zimbabwe. Embedded in the
Integrated Water Resources Management discourse which is alsocaptured by the Water Act is the notion of broad based user partic-
ipation—including previously disadvantaged communal and small-
scale, predominantly African farmers (Gumbo, 2006; Fatch et al.,
2010). Governments in some countries for example Tanzania and
South Africa have also gone a step further in decentralizing irriga-
tion management by promoting farmer managed irrigation
schemes so as to ensure effective management of community
based land and water resources (van Koppen et al., 2004; Mudau,
2010). Irrigation is viewed as a mechanism for reducing the impact
of climate change and climate variability (IPCC, 2007; Ncube et al.,
2011; Chikozho, 2010; de Hamer et al., 2008; Love et al., 2006; Van
der Zaag et al., 2010).
Decentralized water management in irrigation schemes is
commended by various authors including Manzungu and van
der Zaag (1996) who postulate that future irrigators had to
be involved right from the planning stage. In a paper by Food
Agricultural Organisation (FAO, 2000) it is noted that poverty
alleviation will be effected when the position and status of
poorer and smaller farmers is strengthened by their active par-
ticipation in the management of their own development pro-
cess. Peter et al. (2008) further argue that participation in
irrigation is also gendered. Allowing farmers to be active par-
ticipants in the management of irrigation schemes will en-
hance the longevity and productivity of the scheme. Conyers
quoted in Wekwete and de Valk (1990) observed that the rea-
son for this is that decentralization increases the sense of
responsibility of the people (in this case the water users)
and therefore their involvement and commitment to the irriga-
tion scheme will be boosted. Manor (1999) equates this to
democratic decentralization seeking to engage citizens in order
to reduce rural poverty.
A critical aspect of the supporting policy frameworks for the
water sector is a focus on irrigation (Comprehensive Assessment
of Water Management in Agriculture (CAWMA), 2007). This stance
is evidenced by the number of established smallholder irrigation
schemes throughout Zimbabwe. The study therefore sought to ad-
dress the following objectives:
 To analyse how the Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme is
managed.
 To evaluate the different powers and responsibilities that the
Guyu-Chelesa IMC has.
 To proffer recommendations on how to strengthen the irriga-
tion scheme and enhance its productivity.
1.2. The case study
The Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme is located 40 km south of
Gwanda town in Guyu-Chelesa communal area in Ward Fourteen
(14). Ward Fourteen (14) consists of six villages with an estimated
population of seven thousand three hundred and sixty-two (7362).
The villages are Nhlamba, Paye, Sengezane, Sizhubane, Bethel and
Ntanye with a total estimated hectarage of 33,125 including
schools, households, clinics, dips, ﬁelds, stores, paddocks and irri-
gation schemes.
The Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme lies in Matebeleland South
as indicated in Fig. 1. Guyu-Chelesa receives rainfall that is below
500 mm per annum and with high temperatures that lead to in-
creased crop water requirements. The irrigation scheme started
as a research station which was later resuscitated in 1995 into
an Irrigation scheme by farmers who sought to improve their live-
lihoods. The Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme seeks to strengthen
the status of poor smallholder farmers in the community by afford-
ing them an opportunity to participate in the management of their
development process.
Fig. 1. Map of Zimbabwe showing the location of Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme.
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2.1. Introduction
In order to operationalize the research objectives a number of
methods were used. Firstly, a description and justiﬁcation of the
sampling procedures will be made. Then the methods which were
meant to triangulate the different data sources will be presented.
The approaches used include the case study approach, secondary
literature review and ﬁeld data collection (ﬁeld observation). It is
important to note that qualitative ﬁeld observations were central
to understanding the social interactions within and beyond the
IMC. The study asked questions on how the irrigators were repre-
sented through the Irrigation Management Committees (IMCs),
what powers the IMC had and how the farmers were holding them
accountable. Questions were also asked on how the irrigators were
participating in decision making within their irrigation scheme.2.2. Study sample
Williamson et al. (1977, p. 107) stipulates that ‘when we sample
we gather information about a few cases and select to make judg-
ments about a much larger number of cases and select to make
unbiased or representative sample.’ Guyu-Chelesa irrigation
scheme was selected as a case study that represents Ward 14 con-
sisting of six villages. Simple random sampling was utilised due to
the fact that all other smallholder irrigation schemes in Matabele-
land, which fall within the Limpopo River Basin, were given an
equal chance for selection hence a reduction of bias and an in-
crease in representativeness.
The sample size for the study was calculated using the funda-
mental two thirds maxim so as to avert bias and ensure the repre-
sentativeness of the sample. A stratiﬁed simple random samplingwas used to determine the sample size. The total population of
the irrigators is 119. The population was divided into gender strata
so as to ensure that all genders are included into the sample in or-
der to incorporate the views from both. One third of 119 (total
number of irrigating farmers) which is 39 is the number of farmers
who were included in the study sample. The other 36 respondents
were selected from the non-irrigating farmers surrounding the
Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme. Key informant interviews were
conducted with key informants who included the Gwanda (Depart-
ment of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services) AGRITEX
ofﬁcials, the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) and
Gwanda Rural District Council. The non-irrigators were inter-
viewed using the face to face interviewing approach. Stratiﬁed ran-
dom cluster sampling was used to make decisions as to whom to
include in the sample population from the general villagers. Ran-
dom stratiﬁcation was perceived as enabling the selection of differ-
ent proﬁles of respondents as opposed to pure random sampling.2.3. Secondary literature review
Secondary literature review consists of written literature in the
form of professional and academic journals, books, published and
unpublished articles, documents and meeting minutes. This ap-
proach helped address the ﬁrst objective which aimed to analyse
how the Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme is managed. The
researchers made use of the Zimbabwean Water legislation (Zim-
babwe Water Act 1998 and the related Zimbabwe National Water
Authority Act of 1998). Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme’s meeting
minutes, register, documents were also reviewed. The review of
minutes helped address the second objective which was to evalu-
ate the different powers and responsibilities that the Guyu-Chelesa
IMC has. Minutes helped to understand the various powers and
how decisions were made in the absence of the research team.
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Field research comprises the collection of primary empirical
evidence through the use of survey methods such as, question-
naires, interviews and observations. This approach helped address
the ﬁrst objective which was to analyse how the Guyu-Chelesa irri-
gation scheme is managed. Field research took into cognizance the
value of triangulation in data gathering as both qualitative and
quantitative data collection methods were exploited in the salient
study. These included questionnaires, in-depth interviews, key
informant interviews and observations. Field observations were
also central in understanding the power dynamics and further
probe on decision making process. The last objectives on recom-
mendations on the way forward, this made use of all the methods
in order to offer insights for improving irrigation management.2.5. Data analysis
The data analysis entailed the use of bar graphs, pie charts, tab-
ulations, averages to represent data. This basic tabulation was car-
ried out using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).
These were important to triangulate and complement the qualita-
tive data collected through key informant interviews and partici-
patory observations. Historical Trend analysis was carried out in
addition to generic benchmarking in Guyu-Chelesa. This is a social
science approach which maps out key events in any development
such as an irrigation scheme. Thematic analysis was also carried
out where key informant interviews are analysed based on key
themes such as powers held by the IMC and how they were
accountable to the irrigators. A literature review of irrigation
schemes in countries such as South Africa and Tanzania helped
to enrich the Guyu-Chelesa study.3. Results and discussion
3.1. Management of Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme
The Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme (GCIS) is a farmer man-
aged entity with the irrigators in control of the operations of
the scheme. The state was responsible for maintenance of the
infrastructure but this role has recently been passed to the farm-
ers due to the limited state resources. This has been a major
challenge faced by decentralization in smallholder irrigation
schemes in Zimbabwe from the late 1990s to the present. The
state was literally forced to dump its responsibilities to the
irrigators.3.1.1. Background
Guyu-Chelesa is made up of irrigators. Each irrigator has 0.2
hectares of land under irrigation. The total land holding is 85 hect-
ares with the non-irrigated area using the remaining 53 hectares
for a dairy project. Crops grown in the irrigation scheme include
maize, wheat, tomatoes and groundnuts. Tuli River is the source
of water which is pumped through the sand water abstraction
method. The irrigation scheme is responsible for pumping the
water but they have to pay the Zimbabwe National Water Author-
ity (ZINWA) for use of water as per the Water Act of 1998. The
agreement between Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme and ZINWA
signed on the 14th of July 2009 stipulates that water will be paid
at the rate of US$5 per mega litre. The irrigation scheme falls under
the Shashe Sub Catchment Council which lies in the broader
Mzingwane Catchment which forms part of the Limpopo River
Basin.3.1.2. Constitutional framework
Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme operates on the basis of a con-
stitution. This constitution was adopted in 1995. The existence of
this constitution is in line with the national standards which up-
hold the existence of a constitution in each and every organisation
or institution. The Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme’s constitution is
the supreme law that governs the activities and operations of the
scheme. The constitution provides for the general management
of the scheme which captures issues of strategic planning which
are essential for the smooth governance of the scheme hence
enhancing its productivity. As a governance tool the constitution
provides for the establishment of the committees that are meant
to ensure the effective administration of the scheme.
However review of the constitution point to several defects.
While in theory the plot holders should be between 18 and
65 years, there are no youths in this scheme for reasons beyond
the scope of the constitution itself. The absence of the youths in
the irrigation scheme was attributed to migration to the neigh-
bouring South Africa and Botswana. The age of plot holders
stretches over 65–70 years. This age proﬁle compromises the
scheme’s productivity because most irrigators are of old age.
Chapter 2 (section 9(d)) of the Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme
constitution stipulates that the farmers should adhere to farming
procedures postulated by the scheme. The above provision illus-
trates the role of the constitution as a management tool. The con-
stitution in question falls short in identifying and providing for the
penalties to be imposed to those farmers who do not adhere to
stipulated farming procedures. Interviews carried out with the irri-
gators revealed that some farmers are operating contrary to the
stipulated farming procedures and that there are no penalties im-
posed on them. The AGRITEX ofﬁcials also reiterated the senti-
ments expressed by the irrigators concerning the absence of
penalties imposed to farmers who do not adhere to stipulated
farming procedures. Furthermore the constitution does not make
provisions on what should be done to those who do not participate
in the scheme works. Neither does the constitution provide for the
code of conduct that should act as a guiding principle for the
behaviour and accepted standards of the farmers. As noted in
Bjornlund (2004) the absence of a constitution that lays out the
necessary action to be taken against law defaulters and which does
not capacitate the IMC to punish these law defaulters is a major
threat thwarting the productivity of smallholder irrigation scheme
and consequently result in its decline. There is need to amend the
constitution so that it captures the necessary provisions for the
success of the scheme. A code of conduct should also be included
in the amended constitution that will enable the farmers to be held
accountable for their actions or inactions.
3.1.3. Institutional framework
Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme also operates under an IMC
whose establishment is provided for in the constitution of 1995
Section 20(a). It stipulates that the IMC shall have seven (7) mem-
bers that are democratically elected to ofﬁce by the General
Assembly (GA). These members shall consist of the Chairperson,
the Vice Chairperson, the Secretary, the Vice Secretary, the trea-
surer and the two committee members. The IMC is viewed as the
‘Board’ of the scheme. There are also sub-committees that operate
as an extended arm of the IMC by executing the duties delegated to
it by the IMC. These include the disciplinary committee, the crop-
ping committee and dairy committee. They report directly to the
IMC.
The constitution mandates the IMC to call for general meetings,
recommend the suspension of a member from the scheme, and
develop work plans for the scheme. One hundred per cent (100%)
of the responses from questionnaires administered to the
irrigators established that the IMC’s responsibility is the general
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ising, leading and coordinating (POLC) various activities within
the scheme. It is clear that the IMC’s performance has a direct im-
pact on the performance of the entire scheme. If strategic planning
is carried out, communicated to the entire people and imple-
mented successfully the scheme will be successful in fulﬁlling its
food security objectives.
Clearly revealed by the interviews conducted with two AGRITEX
ofﬁcers was the issue of illiteracy among the members of the IMC,
hence their failure to discharge their duties as expected. Of the se-
ven members of the IMC, only one has tertiary education. This
compromises the leadership and management of the scheme. Since
their election into ofﬁce in 2009, they have not managed to pro-
duce even a single strategic plan, ﬁnancial statement and monthly
reports. The councillor for Ward 14 substantiated the above, noting
that though the IMC has undergone a training process they are yet
to appreciate their roles. A Weberian bureaucracy is being advo-
cated for whereby one holds position based on merit. However this
might be a challenge to the concept of decentralization as it advo-
cates for the empowerment of the communities, thus if merit is
adopted as a selection criteria only a few will be selected into
the IMC hence enjoying the monopoly of the management of the
scheme at the expense of other irrigators. In order to promote
inclusiveness and plurality, capacity building programmes should
be launched at the scheme that will incorporate everyone so that
all have an equal chance of being elected into the IMC.
The IMC is struggling to resolve conﬂicts that arise within the
scheme and apply the disciplinary measures required. Funder
et al. (2010) point out that water conﬂicts have to be viewed with-
in the broader governance within the Integrated Water Resources
Management. Seventy-one per cent of the irrigators (20 irrigators)
and two AGRITEX ofﬁcers supported the need to capacitate the
IMC. The IMC does not punish those who do not attend the
scheme’s works, those who have long overdue outstanding debts
within the scheme as well as those who do not follow stipulated
farming procedures. Other reasons for this failure to punish law
defaulters is associated with, lack of provisions from the constitu-
tion that empower the IMC to punish, social relationships that are
in existence as well as fear of being ‘bewitched.’ This incapacity to
manage conﬂicts within the scheme of the IMC contributes to the
poor performance of the scheme as there is no stringent applica-
tion of penalties and conﬂict is left to stir discord within the
scheme.
Accountability, as deﬁned by Manzungu (2008), is taking
responsibility for one’s actions and being answerable for the conse-
quences. Moreover it was highlighted that in smallholder irrigation
schemes it is easy to hold the IMC accountable because they are lo-
cally elected hence the social pressure to be accountable. Thirty per
cent of the irrigators’ questionnaire respondents outlined that the
IMC does not fulﬁl its obligation of being accountable to the gen-
eral assembly. Issues of transparency were raised that the IMC’s
transparency is questionable since the general assembly is side-
lined most of the times in knowing what would be happening
within the scheme. Lack of ﬁnancial accountability was mentioned
as a major drawback of the IMC. However 50% of the irrigator
respondents argued that the IMC is transparent and fulﬁls its obli-
gation of being accountable since before or after taking a particular
action or decision the general assembly is consulted or a report gi-
ven as to why the action or decision has been taken. Twenty per-
cent of the irrigator respondents were not sure as to whether the
IMC is accountable or not.
These views are consistent with the views gathered from the
key informant interviews. The respondents asserted that the IMC
might not be very consultative in nature but it does report back
any action to the GA. Lack of ﬁnancial accountability however isa major drawback to the scheme’s success since the GA‘s resultant
attitude is mistrust and suspicion toward the IMC.3.2. Maintenance of the scheme’s infrastructure
The Department of Irrigation and Agritex are supposed to offer
technical support to the farmers which rarely happen. The general
maintenance of the scheme’s infrastructure is now, by default,
being performed by the farmers themselves through collective ef-
forts. At the moment each farmer is supposed to contribute US$2
per month. Despite the fund that was set for the maintenance
and repairs of the infrastructure, engines and pumps breakdowns
are still prevalent within the scheme. The fund rarely if at all has
adequate ﬁnancial resources because most of the irrigators do
not fulﬁl their obligation of contributing to it. Hence the scheme
is incapacitated to maintain and repair the engines and pumps that
draw water to the plots. Continuous breakdown of engines and
pumps poses a great threat to the productivity of the scheme
and its ﬁnancial position. The ﬁnancial status of the scheme re-
mains unbolstered and the food security threatened since the cycle
for irrigating the crops will be compromised. The farmers agreed to
meet regularly to ensure cleanliness and proper maintenance of
the scheme’s infrastructure. However these are not properly organ-
ised since only a fraction of the entire farmers meet this obligation.
The essence of decentralization is to ensure that decentralised
entities are capacitated to augment their resources so as to ensure
sustainability of the entity. The scheme is not able to raise sufﬁ-
cient resources that will ensure its sustainability. Only a quarter
of the irrigators contribute towards the maintenance fund. In light
of the above the scheme applied for a loan in 2011 from the Rural
Electriﬁcation Agency (REA) in order to repair and purchase a new
engine. However this loan becomes a burden to the irrigators since
they are supposed to pay it back.3.3. Water allocation processes
Water is extracted from Thuli River using a sand abstraction
process. One engine is stationed by the river where it pumps water
to the tanks situated within the scheme. Within the scheme there
are two engines that pump water from the tanks to the ﬁelds. One
individual ensures that the engine situated by the river is switched
on in cases where power would have been cut. There is a pump
minder who is stationed within the scheme to ensure that water
is reaching the ﬁelds.
Irrigators purchased PVC pipes and gate valves, lined them up to
regulate the water distribution process. The ﬁeld is divided into
blocks, with each block consisting of ﬁve plots. Each plot holder
follows an agreed irrigation schedule, with all plots being irrigated
at once. Such water distribution seems even and equal to all plot
holders since each plot holder has 6 h of irrigating. When inter-
viewed, eighty per cent (80%) of the irrigators and the AGRITEX
ofﬁcials were of the view that there is fairness and equity in the
water allocation process since everyone has equal 6 h access to
water for irrigating their plots although there is a technical fault
in the inﬁeld layout which has resulted to low water pressure at
the tail end. However, 20% of the irrigator respondents’ were dis-
satisﬁed. They argued that the water allocation process was un-
even and inequitable because some of the plots receive low
water pressure. This issue seems to be a major concern and has a
tremendous effect on the irrigators as it reduces the yields and of-
ten results in conﬂicts between members. AGRITEX was aware of
the existence of low pressure problem as they mentioned that a
mistake occurred during the design layout of the inﬁeld work.
There is need to revisit the design layout of the inﬁeld work within
the scheme so that the pressure problem for the tail end irrigators
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decentralisation.3.4. Participation
Decentralisation as a concept seeks to enhance participation
among different stakeholders. Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme as
a decentralized entity is meant to be representative of all the vil-
lages in ward fourteen. Seventy per cent of the irrigators pointed
out that, villages such as Ntanye, Paye, Sizhubane, Nhlamba and
Bethel are spatially dispersed. As a result, one village, Sengezane
ends up monopolizing the scheme which is located within this vil-
lage. However, 30% of the irrigators viewed the scheme as repre-
sentative and allows all villages to participate. The scheme was
meant to promote a decentralised approach to the use of local
scarce resources but considering the above the scheme ends up
being concentrated in one village hence downplaying the concept
of decentralisation. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) note that oversight
from the centre is still required to make sure beneﬁts are spread
out equally. Noteworthy is the fact that all villages were given an
equal chance of participating in the scheme but some villages are
located far from where the scheme is located hence making it dif-
ﬁcult for the villagers to foot to the scheme on a daily basis hence
compromising broad participation of the villages. Some irrigators
from distant villages would temporary reside at the lodgings with-
in the irrigation scheme.
Emerging from the interviews carried out with the irrigators,
ZINWA and AGRITEX ofﬁcials is the participatory role of the Zimba-
bwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), the Shashe sub catchment
council, AGRITEX and the department of Irrigation and Engineering
in the operations of the scheme. The Guyu-Chelesa irrigation
scheme’s constitution stipulates that the Department of Irrigation
acts as a technical advisory arm to the scheme though most of
the times the irrigators do not get the necessary support. Located
within the vicinity of the scheme is the Agritex ofﬁcer whose task
is to offer technical advice pertaining to the type of crops to culti-
vate soil management and monitoring adherence of the farmers to
proper farming procedures. The extension ofﬁcer is at times faced
with deﬁance from the farmers who deliberately disregard adher-
ence to proper farming procedures and resist adopting and
embracing a paradigm shift in terms of cultivating cash crops
rather than food crops. In response to the above the irrigators
noted that at times they defy the stipulated procedures due to lim-
ited funds to purchase inputs for the stipulated crop. Moreover is-
sues of food security were indicated as the major reason for
resisting a paradigm shift to cash crops.
Gumbo (2006) stipulates that the role of ZINWA and the sub
catchment council in the participation of water management is
intricately intertwined. If a consumer is drawing water from a ZIN-
WA dam they should have an agreement with the supplier (ZIN-
WA) and be levied on a monthly basis. Whereas if a consumer is
not drawing water directly from a ZINWA dam as in the case of
Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme, a permit shall be acquired from
the sub catchment council and be levied after every harvest. Note-
worthy, is that the irrigators had been issued with both a permit
and an agreement hence resulting in their ﬁscus being heavily
drained such that up to date they still owe ZINWA $3000. It is clear
that between the two institutions lines of communication were
closed and unclear hence laying the burden of ﬁnancial strain on
the irrigators. In order to produce effective broad participation by
these institutions effective communication should be upheld be-
cause it creates a mutual understanding environment between
the participants hence eliminating disorder and enhancing produc-
tivity and efﬁciency. The Shashe sub catchment council and ZINWA
are supposed to have open communication lines pertaining to theoperations of Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme pertaining to water
use and levying strategies.
3.5. Beneﬁts to the community
Despite the shortfalls that have been discussed above pertain-
ing to the operations of the scheme, the scheme still remains ben-
eﬁcial to the community at large. Out of the 36 non-irrigating
villagers interviewed, 80% of them said irrigation is important to
the community. It is, however, important to note that irrigators
were more knowledgeable about the irrigation operations than
non-irrigators. It was also important to note that irrigators had bet-
ter livelihood assets than non-irrigators. One hundred per cent of
the irrigators indicated that the irrigation scheme is of great use
to the community since the community at large is catered for
through the selling of food to them and employment creation in
exchange of food. This way household food security is ensured
for both the irrigators and the community at large. Twenty per cent
of the villagers (non-irrigators) observed that the scheme is pro-
ducing very low yields therefore it becomes difﬁcult for the irriga-
tors to sell the produce to the non-irrigating villagers. Despite the
overwhelming concurrence that the scheme is beneﬁcial to the
community, the villagers and the irrigators observed that the
scheme is not performing to its maximum due to threatening fac-
tors such electricity power cuts, constant engines breakdown and
the uneven water pressure. These factors should be addressed in
order for the scheme to perform at its maximum as a tool of pov-
erty alleviation.
Eighty per cent (80%) of the respondents asserted that the
scheme was offering positive impacts to the community because
in instances of food scarcity due to poor rainfall the community
can purchase food from the irrigation scheme. Moreover the
scheme’s operation acts as an employment creation avenue where-
by the villagers can be engaged in the scheme during harvest and
weeding in return for food. On the contrary the view held by 20% of
the respondents portrays the scheme as a failing entity that is not
beneﬁcial to the community at large because the produce is minute
such that it is even insufﬁcient for the irrigators and their
households.
The irrigators’s overwhelming conﬁdence relating to the bene-
ﬁts the scheme offers to the community is due to the fact that in
Ward 14 there are no reported instances of households with severe
food insecurity. The above statistics suggest that despite various
challenges faced by the scheme, it is managing to fulﬁl one of the
major objectives of smallholder irrigation schemes (SIS) of food
security. The existance of SIS in Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa
and other African countries was mainly positioned on ensuring
food security within the localities. Also the Guyu-Chelesa irrigation
scheme’s constitution stipulates that food security is one of the
scheme’s objectives and the statistics above suggest that this
objective is being met though coupled with various challenges.
3.6. Challenges faced by the scheme
Since its establishment, Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme has
been facing several challenges. Frequent electricity power cuts
are the most threatening factor to the existence of the scheme.
One hundred per cent respondents from the irrigators, villagers
and the AGRITEX ofﬁcials concur on the issue of power cuts being
a huge drawback to the performance of the scheme. During the
data collection period, the scheme’s activities were at standstill
for two weeks since there was no electricity. Fig. 2a and b below
indicates pictures with crops when they were being irrigated and
the other two weeks later without being irrigated.
Due to the frequent electricity cuts and the resulting inability to
pump water for irrigation, the yield of the scheme at the end of the
Fig. 2. (a) Crops when they were irrigated. (b) Withered crops due to water shortage.
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unable to pay for electricity bills, water and maintenance levy. In
light of the above, it is imperative for the scheme to craft and draft
a new strategy that will counter the power problem. Solar energy
as a strategy to counter the power crisis should be adopted because
of its affordability. However, the feasibility of this need to be as-
sessed ﬁrst and lessons could be drawn from the European Union
project which has implemented some solar powered irrigation
pumps in Zimbabwe.
The scheme also lacks a comprehensive constitution that directs
its operations in a productivity oriented manner. As has been noted
earlier, the constitution should be amended and disseminated to
all the irrigators in order to improve the operations of the scheme.
Research ﬁndings also point to the administrative incapacity of the
IMC, lack of capacity to repair and maintain the scheme’s infra-
structure among others. The amendment of the constitution cou-
pled with the entire scheme’s capacity building projects will
result in a successful scheme which is in compliance with theFig. 3. Pie chart presenting components of the scheme that needs improvement
according to irrigators.decentralised model. The constitution should be written in the lo-
cal Ndebele language to be better understood by all irrigators.
Fig. 3 shows the response to the question on what the irrigator
respondents considered as the major problems facing the Guyu-
Chelesa irrigation scheme which needed to be addressed.
The major thrust of SIS in Zimbabwe and Africa at large (Ofusu
et al., 2010) is to ensure food security within the localities. In order
for the above objective to be accomplished several components of
the scheme has to be strengthened. The above statistics reﬂect that
39% of the irrigator respondents indicated that resolving electricity
issues should be a priority to the scheme. Indicated above are the
severe power cuts that affect the productivity of the scheme there-
fore a need to implement a long term strategy to curb the problem.
Water allocation processes ranked second as 32% of the irrigator
respondents expressed concerns that the process should be revised
to ensure equity within the scheme. This view is important in that
water lies at the core of irrigation and therefore the irrigation
scheme depends on water for its survival. Twenty-seven per cent
of the respondents noted that the institutional framework of the
scheme should be strengthened since it is the ‘board’ of the scheme
that is concerned with management issues of the scheme. A weak
institutional framework results in a failing scheme because impor-
tant issues like water management, discipline within the scheme,
ﬁnancial accountability will be poorly administered. Two per cent
of the irrigator respondents observed that the constitutional
framework should be strengthened as well in order to capture
important management issues that are not captured by the current
framework. The reason for a low 2% response is a result of illiter-
acy. Most irrigators were not even aware of the existence of the
constitutional framework and its importance.3.7. Comparative analysis
Review of cases in other countries reﬂects almost the same
experiences as those gathered from Guyu-Chelesa irrigation
scheme. The Domasi smallholder irrigation scheme in Malawi as
in the case of Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme is faced with issues
of administrative incapacity since only 13% of the farmers had re-
ceived training. Mupawose (1984) cited in FAO (1998), notes that
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mally and are performing below capacity utilisation due to lack of
farming knowledge and experience by the irrigators and poor man-
agement skills. Bembridge (2000) cited in a dissertation by Mudau
(2010) indicates that the failure or near collapse of South African
smallholder irrigation schemes can be attributed to a combination
of lack of funds, poor management of the scheme, lack of a compre-
hensive legislation that empowers the IMCs to make decisions per-
taining to ‘bad’ farmers and poor maintenance of infrastructure
hence resulting in low productivity and poverty.
These scenarios are inconsistent with the downwardly account-
able decentralization model which stipulates that a decentralised
entity should increase efﬁciency, more thorough going equity
and greater participation since the State, which is viewed as a con-
straint to efﬁciency, will be empowering the communities. Envis-
aged also in the decentralisation model is the notion that,
allowing farmers to be active and manage the irrigation schemes
will enhance the longevity and productivity of the scheme, Conyers
quoted in Wekwete and de Valk (1990). The survey ﬁndings gath-
ered from Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme and the experiences
from other Sub-Saharan African countries reﬂect a decentralisation
model which is not properly implemented as evidenced by their
poor yields and poor management of the irrigation schemes.
Despite the above mentioned impediments to the viability of
smallholder irrigation schemes in Africa, these schemes together
with the Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme remain of paramount
importance as they endeavour to comply with what is envisaged
in the decentralization literature on food security. This study con-
tributes to the literature on IWRM and how water users (irrigators)
can participate in decision making as advocated by the 1992 Dub-
lin Principles.4. Conclusions
One of IWRM’s key tenet is that water users have to participate
in water use and its management under the Dublin Principles. This
study used the decentralization lens to understand how irrigators
in Guyu-Chelesa are participating in water management and with
what outcomes. The ﬁndings from this study further demonstrate
that whilst it is important to have decentralised management in
the Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme, it is also important to under-
stand what out comes result from the management structure. This
is clearly in line with what Agrawal and Ribot (1999) talk about
decentralization resulting in positive outcomes. The second ﬁnding
was that different powers had been devolved to the Guyu-Chelesa
irrigation. The devolved powers are, however, meaningless if they
are not linked to increased resources at the local level. For instance,
the irrigators were asked to take over more responsibilities be-
cause the central state was running out of funds from the late
1990s. Thirdly, in order to enhance decentralized irrigation gover-
nance, the study recommends that the state should decentralize
powers but also provide an oversight role to make sure there is
equitable development at the local level. Such oversight role will
legitimate the local institutions and capacitate them for sustain-
able irrigation schemes. Participation of water users through
decentralized irrigation management should not be naively viewed
as a panacea for irrigation management challenges. Participation is
one of the several aspects of water and its political-economy con-
text which need to be understood to help inform successful IWRM
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